Abstract. We consider RSA-type schemes with modulus N = p r q for r ≥ 2. We present two new attacks for small secret exponent d. Both approaches are applications of Coppersmith's method for solving modular univariate polynomial equations [5] . From these new attacks we directly derive partial key exposure attacks, i.e. attacks when the secret exponent is not necessarily small but when a fraction of the secret key bits is known to the attacker. Interestingly, all of these attacks work for public exponents e of arbitrary size. Additionally, we present partial key exposure attacks for the value dp = d mod p−1 which is used in CRT-variants like Takagi's scheme [11] . Our results show that RSA-type schemes that use moduli of the form N = p r q are more susceptible to attacks that leak bits of the secret key than the original RSA scheme.
Introduction
We investigate attacks on cryptographic schemes that use public moduli of the form N = p r q for some constant r > 1. Moduli of this type have recently been used in different cryptographic designs. Fujioke, Okamoto and Uchiyama [6] presented an electronic cash scheme using a modulus N = p 2 q. Furthermore, Okamoto and Uchiyama [10] designed an elegant public-key crypto scheme that is provably as secure as factoring a modulus N = p 2 q. A fast CRT-RSA variant using moduli of the form N = p r q was introduced by Takagi [11] in 1998. The larger one chooses r in Takagi's scheme, the more efficient is the scheme for a fixed bit-size of the modulus N .
Consider an RSA-type scheme with public key (N, e), where N = p r q for some fixed r > 1 and p, q are of the same bit-size. The secret key d satisfies ed = 1 mod φ(N ), where φ(N ) is Euler's totient function. We denote by * φ(N ) the multiplicative group of invertible integers modulo φ(N ). In 1999, Boneh, Durfee and Howgrave-Graham [3] showed that schemes with moduli of the form N = p r q are more susceptible to attacks that leak bits of p than the original RSA-scheme. Using Coppersmith's method for solving univariate modular equations [5] , they showed that it suffices to know a fraction of 1 r+1 of the MSBs of p to factor the modulus. It is an interesting task, whether schemes with N = p r q are also more susceptible to attacks that leak bits of the secret exponent d. In most side-channel attack scenarios (see for instance [7, 8] ), it is more reasonable to assume that an adversary gains knowledge of a fraction of the secret key bits than knowledge of the prime factor bits.
Intuitively, one should expect that crypto-systems with moduli of the form N = p r q, r > 1 are more vulnerable to secret key attacks than the original RSAscheme, since for a fixed bit-size of N the amount of secret information encoded in the prime factors is smaller than in RSA. Hence, these schemes should be more susceptible to small secret key attacks like the Wiener attack [12] and the Boneh-Durfee attack [1] . Likewise, these schemes should be more susceptible to so-called partial key exposure attacks that use the knowledge of a fraction of the secret key bits like the Boneh-Durfee-Frankel attack [2] and the Blömer-May attack [4] .
In contrast to this intuition, it was stated in the work of Takagi [11] that RSA-type schemes with N = p r q seem to be less vulnerable to attacks for small decryption exponents d than the original RSA-scheme. Namely, Takagi showed a generalized Wiener-bound of d ≤ N 1 2(r+1) . However, we introduce two attacks with improved bounds for the size of d. Both new attacks are applications of Coppersmith's method for solving modular univariate polynomial equations [5] .
Our first attack directly uses the results of Boneh, Durfee and HowgraveGraham [2] for factoring N = p r q. It yields an improved bound of
Let us compare the results for r = 2: Takagi requires that d ≤ N Our second method makes use of Coppersmith's method in the univariate case and leads to the bound
Interestingly in contrast to the previous bounds, this new bound converges to N for growing r instead of converging to 1. It improves upon our first attack for all parameter choices r ≥ 3: The second attack requires that d ≤ N -One cannot counteract the new attacks by choosing large public exponents e, since the attacks are independent of the value of e. In comparison, the Wiener bound d ≤ N that e < φ(N ). It is known that the attacks cannot be applied for any size of d if e > N 1.5 or e > N 1.875 , respectively. -The new attacks immediately imply a partial key exposure attack for d with known most significant bits (MSBs). Namely, it makes no difference in the attacks whether the most significant bits of d are zero (and thus d is a small decryption exponent) or are known to the attacker. In contrast, Wiener's attack and the Boneh-Durfee attack for small decryption exponents do not work when the MSB's are non-zero but known. In addition, the new attacks also provide partial key exposure attacks for known least significant bits (LSBs).
Using the first attack, we are able to prove that a fraction of The resulting partial key exposure attacks share the same property as the underlying attacks for small decryption exponents d: They do not rely on the size of the public exponent e. Note that all partial key exposure attacks mentioned in the literature [2, 4] are dependent on e and do not work for arbitrary e ∈ * φ(N ) . The new methods are the first partial key exposure attacks that work for all public exponents e.
The reason that all former attacks on RSA-type schemes depend on the size of e is that they all compute the parameter k in the RSA key equation ed − 1 = kφ(N ). In contrast, our new attacks do not require the computation of k. Thus, k must not be a small parameter and hence the parameters e and d can be increased (thereby increasing k) without affecting the usability of the attacks.
The reason that our new attacks do not require the direct computation of k is mainly that for moduli N = p r q the group order of the multiplicative group Z * N is φ(N ) = p r−1 (p−1)(q−1). Thus for r ≥ 2, φ(N ) and N share the common divisors p and p r−1 , respectively, and this can be used in the attacks by constructing polynomials with small roots modulo p (our first attack) and modulo p r−1 (our second attack), respectively. But looking at the equation ed−1 = kφ(N ) modulo p (respectively modulo p r−1 ) removes the unknown parameter k. We want to point out that these new attacks are normally not a threat to Takagi's scheme [11] . Since Takagi's CRT-decryption process only makes use of the values d p = d mod p − 1 and d q = d mod q − 1, it suffices to choose an d which satisfies ed = 1 mod (p − 1)(q − 1). For this kind of public-key/secret-key pair (e, d), our previous attacks do not apply. Even worse, normally one would not even store the value of d but only the values of d p and d q for the decryption process. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that an attacker may only get bits of d p or d q . Hence, it is an interesting task to derive partial key exposure attacks for known bits of d p (respectively d q ).
We show that the partial key exposure attacks of Blömer and May [4] for moduli N = pq generalize to the case N = p r q. Interestingly, the results are again much better for r > 1. Namely, we present attacks that need only a fraction of 1 r + 1 of the MSBs or LSBs of d p when the public exponent e is small. This shows that Takagi's scheme is also more susceptible to attacks that leak bits of d p than normal CRT-RSA. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review Coppersmith's method for modular univariate polynomial equations [5] . Here, we introduce a reformulation of Coppersmith's orginal theorem that unifies all known applications (see [2] [3] [4] [5] ) of the method in the univariate case. As an example, we derive the result of Boneh, Durfee and Howgrave-Graham [3] for factoring N = p r q as a direct application of Coppersmith's theorem. The first attack for small d and the corresponding partial key exposure attacks are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe our second attack. The partial key exposure attacks for d p are presented in Section 5.
Coppersmith's method and the result of BDH
Let us recall Coppersmith's theorem for solving modular univariate polynomial equations [5] . Here, we give the theorem in a slightly more general form than originally stated. However, one can prove the theorem in a completely analogous way to the reasoning in the original proof of Coppersmith. We give the details of the proof in the full version of the paper. r . In fact, the following theorem is stated in the original work of Boneh, Durfee and Howgrave-Graham for the special case k = 1, but we formulate it in a slightly more general way, since we will use this generalization in Section 3.
Theorem 2 (BDH) Let N = p r q, where r is a known constant and p, q are of the same bit-size. Let k be an (unknown) integer that is not a multiple of p r−1 q. Suppose we know an integerp with
Then N can be factored in polynomial time.
Let us interpret the result of Theorem 2. In order to factor N it suffices to find an integerp which is within the range N r (r+1) 2 of some multiple of p (which is not a multiple of N ). In the following section, we present our first new attack that constructs an integerp with the above property whenever d is sufficiently small.
The attack modulo p
We present our first attack for small decryption exponents d and afterwards extend this approach to partial key exposure attacks.
Theorem 3 Let N = p r q, where r ≥ 2 is a known constant and p, q are primes of the same bit-size. Let (e, d) ∈ × * φ(N ) be the public-key/secret-key pair satisfying ed = 1 mod φ(N ). Suppose that
Then N can be factored in probabilistic polynomial time.
Proof: We know that φ(N ) = p r−1 (p − 1)(q − 1) and therefore the key pair (e, d) satisfies the equation ed − 1 = kp r−1 (p − 1)(q − 1) for some k ∈ AE.
(1) Let E be the inverse of e modulo N , i.e. Ee = 1 + cN for some c ∈ AE. If E does not exist then gcd(e, N ) must be a non-trivial divisor of N .
Note that each possible non-trivial divisor p s , p s q or q (1 ≤ s ≤ r) does immediately yield the complete factorization of N : p s can be easily factored by guessing s and taking the s th root over the integers. On the other hand, p s q yields N p s q = p r−s which reduces this case to the previous one. Similarly, q gives us p r . Hence, let us assume wlog that the inverse E of e modulo N exists. Multiplying equation (1) by E leads to
Thus, E is a multiple of p up to an additive error of d ≤ N r (r+1) 2 . In order to apply Theorem 2, it remains to show that the expression Ekp r−2 (p−1)(q−1)−cp r−1 qd is not a multiple of p r−1 q. Since p r−1 q divides the second term, this is equivalent to show that Ek(p − 1)(q − 1) is not a multiple of pq. By assumption, we have gcd(E, N ) = 1 and thus it remains to prove that pq does not divide k(p−1)(q−1). Assume k(p − 1)(q − 1) = c ′ pq for some c ′ ∈ AE. Then equation (1) simplifies to
On the other hand we know that eE − 1 = cN . Combining both equalities we obtain that d = E mod N . Since d, E < N we have d = E even over . It is a well-known fact that the knowledge of the secret key d yields the factorization of N in probabilistic polynomial time (see for instance [9] , Chapter 4.6.1). We briefly summarize our factorization algorithm. Corollary 4 (MSB) Let N = p r q, where r ≥ 2 is a known constant and p, q are primes of the same bit-size. Let (e, d) ∈ × * φ(N ) be the public-key/secret-key pair satisfying ed = 1 mod φ(N ). Givend such that
Proof: The key-pair (e, d) satisfies the equality
Let E = e −1 mod N , i.e. Ee = 1 + cN for some c ∈ AE. If E does not exist, we obtain the factorization of N . Multiplying the above equation by E yields
Thus, E(ed − 1) is a multiple of p up to an additive error of |d −d| ≤ N r (r+1) 2 . The rest of the proof is completely analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary 4 implies that one has to know roughly a fraction of 1 − r (r+1) 2 of the MSBs of d for our partial key exposure attack. We can also derive a partial key exposure attack for known LSBs with an analogous bound.
Corollary 5 (LSB) Let N = p r q, where r ≥ 2 is a known constant and p, q are primes of the same bit-size. Let (e, d) ∈ × * φ(N ) be the public-key/secret-key pair satisfying ed = 1 mod φ(N ).
Proof: Let us write
We have the key equation
Multiply the equation by E = (eM ) −1 mod N . We see that E(ed 0 − 1) is a multiple of p up to an additive error of |d 1 | < N r (r+1) 2 . The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.
Attack modulo p Ö 1
Our first attack applied Theorem 2 which in turn uses a polynomial with small roots modulo p. In our second attack we will construct a polynomial with a small root modulo p r−1 and directly apply Coppersmith's method in the univariate case (Theorem 1). This approach yields better results than the first one whenever r ≥ 3.
Theorem 6 Let N = p r q, where r ≥ 2 is a known constant and p, q are primes of the same bit-size. Let (e, d) ∈ × * φ(N ) be the public-key/secret-key pair satisfying ed = 1 mod φ(N ). Suppose that
Proof: The key pair (e, d) satisfies the equation
Let E be the inverse of e modulo N , i.e. Ee = 1 + cN for some c ∈ N . In the case that E does not exist, gcd(e, N ) yields the complete factorization of N as shown in the proof of Theorem 3. Multiplying our equation by E leads to
This gives us a simple univariate polynomial
with the root x 0 = d modulo p r−1 . Thus, we have a polynomial f p r−1 of degree δ = 1 with a root x 0 modulo p r−1 . In order to apply Theorem 1, we have to find a lower bound for p r−1 in terms of N .
Since p and q are of the same bit-size, we know that p ≥ Hence, we obtain the value x 0 = d. We can run a probabilistic factorization algorithm on input (N, e, d) in order to obtain the factorization of N in expected polynomial time.
Remark 7 Another (deterministic) polynomial time method to find the factorization of N could be the computation of gcd(ed − 1, N ). Since ed − 1 = kp r−1 (p − 1)(q − 1), the computation yields a non-trivial divisor of N iff pq does not divide k(p − 1)(q − 1), which is unlikely to happen. As shown in the proof of Theorem 3, a non-trivial divisor of N reveals the complete factorization of the modulus. So in practice, one might try this alternative gcd-method first and if it fails, one applies a probabilistic algorithm on the key-pair (N, e, d).
Let us summarize our new factorization algorithm. 
Proof: We know that In a similar fashion, we derive a partial key exposure attack for known LSBs. The partial key exposure attacks that we consider in this section for moduli N = p r q can be considered as a generalization of the results of Blömer and May [4] . The attacks are an application of the theorem of Boneh, Durfee and Howgrave-Graham (Theorem 2).
We derive simple partial key exposure attacks for small public exponents e in both cases: known MSBs and known LSBs. The new attacks are a threat to schemes that use CRT-decoding (for instance Takagi's scheme [11] ) in combination with small public exponents.
Let us state our LSB-attack.
Theorem 10 Let N = p r q, where r ≥ 1 is a known constant and p, q are primes of the same bit-size. Let e be the public key and let d p satisfy ed p = 1 mod p − 1. Then N can be factored in time e · poly(log(N )).
